A patent provides its holder the monopolist´s right to sell licenses that allow the use of new technology. Empirically, most of the patent licensing agreements that are observed include royalties, in particular per unit ...

We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common ...

This paper provides a new model of network formation that bridges the gap between the two benchmark models by Bala and Goyal, the one-way flow model, and the two-way flow model, and includes both as particular extreme ...

Most of the patent licensing agreements that are observed include royalties, in particular per-unit or ad valorem royalties. This paper shows that in a differ entiated duopoly that competes á la Cournot the optimal ...

We report the findings of an experiment designed to study how people learn and make decisions in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to e.g. random ...

We extend the classic Merton (1969, 1971) problem that investigates the joint consumption-savings and portfolio-selection problem under capital risk by assuming sophisticated but time-inconsistent agents. We introduce ...

We provide a model that merges two basic models of strategic network formation and incorporates them as extreme cases: Jackson and Wolinsky' s connections model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal' s ...

I contrast the theoretical foundation of profit maximization of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green’s “Microeconomics” against that provided by Scitovsky in a paper of 1943. Whereas Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green try to show ...

In this paper, we show that in order for third-degree price discrimination to increase total output, the demands of the strong markets should be, as conjectured by Robinson (1933), more concave than the demands of the weak ...

We report on a two-stage experiment in which i) we first elicit the social network within a section of undergraduate students and ii) we then measure their altruistic attitudes by means of a standard Dictator game. We ...