The paper presents a framework where the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. The paper also suggests that similar frameworks may be useful for other coalitional models.

We consider cooperation situations where players have network relations. Networks evolve according to a stationary transition probability matrix and at each moment in time players receive payoffs from a stationary allocation ...

We introduce and analyze a new solution concept for TU games:The Surplus Distributor Prekernel. Like the prekermel, the new solu- tion is based on the an alternative motion of complaint of one player against other with ...

We provide a model that merges two basic models of strategic network formation and incorporates them as extreme cases: Jackson and Wolinsky' s connections model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal' s ...

We report on a two-stage experiment in which i) we first elicit the social network within a section of undergraduate students and ii) we then measure their altruistic attitudes by means of a standard Dictator game. We ...

Coal-fired power plants may enjoy a significant advantage relative to gas plants in terms of cheaper fuel cost. Still, this advantage may erode or even turn into disadvantage depending on CO2 emission allowance price. This ...

We prove that the SD-prenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SD-prenucleolus is thus the only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for ...

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, ...

The emergence of cooperation is analyzed in heterogeneous populations where individuals can be classified in two groups according to their phenotypic appearance. Phenotype recognition is assumed for all individuals: ...

The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2])and maximum ...