dc.contributor.author | Kovarik, Jaromir | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-01-23T12:59:17Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-01-23T12:59:17Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10810/6416 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper surveys the theories of social preferences. Social preferences are based on that people not only care about their own well-being, but they have a certain concern with payoffs and/or actions of others. We classify two approaches: distributional and intention-based models, and later discuss models that combine both theories. In order to provide a better illustration of the discussed models, we derive predictions of these models for two classic experimental protocols: ultimatum game and public good game with punishment. These predictions are compared with the stylized facts of these two games. | es |
dc.description.sponsorship | Financial support from the Spanish Ministry
of Education and Science (AP-2004-1893) is greatfully acknowledged. | es |
dc.language.iso | eng | es |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Ikerlanak 2009.36 | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ | * |
dc.title | Social Preferences - Literature Survey | es |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | es |
dc.rights.holder | Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported | * |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:ehu:ikerla:200936 | es |
dc.departamentoes | Fundamentos del análisis económico I | es_ES |
dc.departamentoeu | Ekonomia analisiaren oinarriak I | es_ES |