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dc.contributor.authorKovarik, Jaromir ORCID
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-23T12:59:17Z
dc.date.available2012-01-23T12:59:17Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/6416
dc.description.abstractThis paper surveys the theories of social preferences. Social preferences are based on that people not only care about their own well-being, but they have a certain concern with payoffs and/or actions of others. We classify two approaches: distributional and intention-based models, and later discuss models that combine both theories. In order to provide a better illustration of the discussed models, we derive predictions of these models for two classic experimental protocols: ultimatum game and public good game with punishment. These predictions are compared with the stylized facts of these two games.es
dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (AP-2004-1893) is greatfully acknowledged.es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIkerlanak 2009.36
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/*
dc.titleSocial Preferences - Literature Surveyes
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperes
dc.rights.holderAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported*
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:ehu:ikerla:200936es
dc.departamentoesFundamentos del análisis económico Ies_ES
dc.departamentoeuEkonomia analisiaren oinarriak Ies_ES


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Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported