dc.contributor.author | Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier | |
dc.contributor.author | Feltkamp, Vincent | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-01-25T13:14:13Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-01-25T13:14:13Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007-10 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10810/6480 | |
dc.description.abstract | We characterize a monotonic core concept defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of
monotonic core concepts for veto balanced games and we show that, in general, the nucleolus per capita is not monotonic. | es |
dc.description.sponsorship | J. Arín acknowledges financial support provided by Project 9/UPV00031.321-15352/2003 of the University of the Basque Country and Project SEJ2006-05455 of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science. This author also thanks the "Salvador de Madariaga" Program of the Ministry of Education and Science of Spain for the financial support provided. | es |
dc.language.iso | eng | es |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Ikerlanak 2007.28 | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ | * |
dc.subject | monotonicity | es |
dc.subject | core | es |
dc.subject | TU games | es |
dc.subject | nucleolus per capita | es |
dc.title | On monotonic core allocations for coalitional games whith veto players | es |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | es |
dc.rights.holder | Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported | * |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:ehu:ikerla:200728 | es |
dc.departamentoes | Fundamentos del análisis económico I | es_ES |
dc.departamentoeu | Ekonomia analisiaren oinarriak I | es_ES |