dc.contributor.author | Rocha, André Barreira da Silva | |
dc.contributor.author | Laruelle, Annick | |
dc.contributor.author | Zuazo Garín, Peio | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-02-01T12:53:15Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-02-01T12:53:15Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011-12 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10810/6608 | |
dc.description.abstract | We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability. | es |
dc.description.sponsorship | This research is supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación under projects SEJ2006-05455 and ECO2009-11213, co-funded by ERDF, and by Basque Government funding for Grupo Consolidado GIC07/146-IT-377-07. | es |
dc.language.iso | eng | es |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN/SEJ2006-05455 | |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN/ECO2009-11213 | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Ikerlanak 2011.57 | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ | * |
dc.title | Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games | es |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | es |
dc.rights.holder | Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported | * |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:ehu:ikerla:6608 | es |
dc.departamentoes | Fundamentos del análisis económico I | es_ES |
dc.departamentoeu | Ekonomia analisiaren oinarriak I | es_ES |