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dc.contributor.authorIñarra García, María Elena ORCID
dc.contributor.authorLaruelle, Annick ORCID
dc.contributor.authorZuazo Garín, Peio
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-20T13:48:48Z
dc.date.available2012-11-20T13:48:48Z
dc.date.issued2012-10-23
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/9099
dc.description.abstractWe assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's types, and payoffs are assumed to be type-independent. We analyze whether the mere possibility of different types playing different strategies generates discriminatory equilibria. Given a specific information structure we find that in equilibrium a player discriminates between her types if and only if her opponent does so. We also find that for dominant solvable 2x2 games no discriminatory equilibrium exists, while under different conditions of concordance between players' beliefs discrimination appears for coordination and for competitive games. A complete characterization of the set of Bayesian equilibria is provided.es
dc.description.sponsorshipSpanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación under project ECO2009-11213, co-funded by ERDF. Basque Government funding for Grupo Consolidado GIC07/146-IT-377-07.es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherDeparamento de fundamentos del análisis económico Ies
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIkerlanak;2012.64
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/*
dc.subject2x2 matrix gameses
dc.subjectincomplete informationes
dc.titleGames with perceptionses
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperes
dc.rights.holderAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported*
dc.subject.jelC72
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:ehu:ikerla:9099es
dc.departamentoesFundamentos del análisis económico Ies_ES
dc.departamentoeuEkonomia analisiaren oinarriak Ies_ES
dc.subject.categoriaMATHEMATICAL AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS


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