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Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Population
(Departamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I / Ekonomi analisiaren oinarriak I saila, 2012-09-19)
Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, ...
Games with perceptions
(Deparamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I, 2012-10-23)
We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a
dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's ...
The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico IDepartamento de Economía Aplicada IV, 2012-11)
We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M ...
Discriminating by Tagging: Artificial Distinction, Real Discrimination
(2011-02-08)
We introduce a new variation of the hawk-dove game suggested by an experiment that studies the behavior of a group of domestic fowls when a subgroup has been marked. Speci cally we consider a population formed by two types ...
Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games
(2011-12)
We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete ...
To appove or not to approve: this is not the only question
(2012)
This paper deals with electing candidates. In elections voters are frequently offered
a small set of actions (voting in favor of one candidate, voting blank, spoiling the
ballot, and not showing up). Thus voters can ...
An axiomatization of success
(2011)
In this paper we give an axiomatic characterization of three families of measures of success defined by Laruelle and Valenciano (2005) for voting rules.
A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2014-09-16)
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2])and maximum ...
Rationing Rules and Stable Coalition Structures
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2016-10-05)
We consider a coalition formation model in which agents have the possibility of forming part of several coalitions but are limited to participate in only one of them. Coalitions of agents produce outputs to be
distributed ...
Strategic Interaction and Conventions
(University of the Basque Country, Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II, 2010-06)
The scope of the paper is the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are ...