Erceg et al. (J Monet Econ 46:281-313, 2000) introduce sticky wages in a New-Keynesian general-equilibrium model. Alternatively, it is shown here how wage stickiness may bring unemployment fluctuations into a New-Keynesian ...

Using a model of an optimizing monetary authority which has preferences that weigh inflation and unemployment, Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) finds empirical evidence that the authority has asymmetric preferences for ...

This paper proposes an extended version of the basic New Keynesian monetary (NKM) model which contemplates revision processes of output and inflation data in order to assess the importance of data revisions on the estimated ...

In this paper, we assess the forecasting performance of count data models applied to arts attendance. We estimate participation models for two artistic activities that differ in their degree of popularity -museum and jazz ...

We consider a job contest in which candidates go through interviews (cheap talk) and are subject to reference checks. We show how competitive pressure - increasing the ratio of "good" to "bad" type candi- dates - can ...

The paper investigates whether the growing GDP share of the services sector can contribute to explain the great moderation in the US. We identify and analyze three oil price shocks and use a SVAR analysis to measure their ...

Optimal management in a multi-cohort Beverton-Holt model with any number of age classes and imperfect selectivity is equivalent to finding the optimal fish lifespan by chosen fallow cycles. Optimal policy differs in two ...

The European Commission Report on Competition in Professional Services found that recommended prices by professional bodies have a significant negative effect on competition since they may facilitate the coordination of ...

Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral ...

A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1, $2, .., $n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state i.e. who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents' prefer- ences over ...