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Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2013-12)
We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who ...
Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2013-10-10)
This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by
Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, ...