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On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the case of two-person NTU games
(Springer, 2012-03)
On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and ...
The reverse self-dual serial cost-sharing rule
(Departamento de Economía Aplicada IV, UPV-EHU, 2012)
In this study we define a cost sharing rule for cost sharing
problems. This rule is related to the serial cost-sharing rule defined by Moulin
and Shenker (1992). We give some formulas and axiomatic characterizations
for ...
Intermediate serial cost-sharing rules
(Departamento de Economía Aplicada IV, UPV/EHU, 2014)
In this paper we give a generalization of the serial cost-sharing rule defined by Moulin and Shenker (1992) for cost sharing problems. According to the serial cost sharing rule, agents with low demands of a good pay cost ...
Simple Coalitional Strategy Profiles in Repeated Games
(2014-10-28)
In this paper we introduce simple coalitional profi les to avoid group
deviations in repeated games. In the repeated Cournot supergame we
prove that it is possible to sustain the symmetric monopoly outcome
by means of ...
The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico IDepartamento de Economía Aplicada IV, 2012-11)
We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M ...
An axiomatization of success
(2011)
In this paper we give an axiomatic characterization of three families of measures of success defined by Laruelle and Valenciano (2005) for voting rules.
A common axiom for classical division rules for claims problems
(Departamento de Economía Aplicada IV, UPV/EHU, 2015)
In this paper we introduce a new axiom, denoted claims separability, that is satisfied by several classical division rules defined for claims problems. We characterize axiomatically the entire family of division rules that ...
A potential approach to claims problems
(Departamento de Economía Aplicada IV, UPV/EHU, 2015)
Hart and Mas Colell (1989) introduce the potential function for cooperative TU games. In this paper, we extend this approach to claims problems, also known as bankruptcy or rationing problems. We show that for appropriate ...
The minimal overlap cost sharing rule
(Departamento de Economía Aplicada IV, UPV/EHU, 2015)
In this paper we introduce a new cost sharing rule-the minimal overlap cost sharing rule-which is associated with the minimal overlap rule for claims problems defined by O'Neill (1982). An axiomatic characterization is ...
Network formation under institutional constraints
(2011-05)
We study the effects of institutional constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. An exogenous "societal cover" consisting of a collection of possibly overlapping subsets covering the set of players specifies ...