The case against evaluative realism

dc.contributor.author	López de Sa, Dan
dc.date.accessioned	2020-01-29T15:36:24Z
dc.date.available	2020-01-29T15:36:24Z
dc.date.issued	2006
dc.identifier.citation	Theoria 21(3) : 277-294 (2006)
dc.identifier.issn	2171-679X
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10810/39321
dc.description.abstract	In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitibve causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.title	The case against evaluative realism
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.holder	© 2006, Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco Euskal Herriko Unibertsitateko Argitalpen Zerbitzua