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dc.contributor.authorPagès, Joan
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-29T17:16:13Z
dc.date.available2020-01-29T17:16:13Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.citationTheoria 24(1) : 49-61 (2009)
dc.identifier.issn2171-679X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/39387
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I will first present and defend Molnar's way of setting out the problem of finding truthmakers for negative propositions. Secondly, I will reply to two objections to what in my view is the most promising general approach to the problem of negatives. Finally, I will present and defend Cheyne and Pidgen's specific proposal that falls under that general promising approach.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherServicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.titleTruthmakers for negatives
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.holder© 2009, Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco Euskal Herriko Unibertsitateko Argitalpen Zerbitzua


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