dc.contributor.author | Rayo, Agustín | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-01-29T19:20:51Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-01-29T19:20:51Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Theoria 30(3) : 349-363 (2015) | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2171-679X | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10810/39596 | |
dc.description.abstract | In Modality and Explanatory Reasoning, Boris Kment argues that a single notion of essence can be used to play two distinct theoretical roles. He thinks there is an important connec- tion between essence and metaphysical necessity, on the one hand, and between essence and metaphysical explanation, on the other. In this paper I will argue that it is not clear that a single notion of essence should be used to perform both these jobs. For whereas the project of giving metaphysical explanations requires a notion of essence that distinguishes between truths that are more or less “funda- mental” in a metaphysical sense, the project of shedding light on metaphysical necessity does not. | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.publisher | Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.title | Essence without fundamentality | |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.rights.holder | © 2015, Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco Euskal Herriko Unibertsitateko Argitalpen Zerbitzua | |