Now showing items 11-20 of 44
A Marginalist Model of Network Formation
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2016-08-18)
We develop a network-formation model where the quality of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by a link-formation "technology" , an increasing strictly concave function which is the only exogenous ...
Rationing Rules and Stable Coalition Structures
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2016-10-05)
We consider a coalition formation model in which agents have the possibility of forming part of several coalitions but are limited to participate in only one of them. Coalitions of agents produce outputs to be distributed ...
A monotonic core concept for convex games: The SD-prenucleolus
(Departamento de Fundamentos dle Análisis Económico I, 2013-02-26)
We prove that the SD-prenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SD-prenucleolus is thus the only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for ...
Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2013-10-10)
This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, ...
Emergence of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Population: A Discrete-Time Replicator Dynamics Analysis
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, 2013-12)
The emergence of cooperation is analyzed in heterogeneous populations where individuals can be classified in two groups according to their phenotypic appearance. Phenotype recognition is assumed for all individuals: ...
The coincidence of the kernel and nucleolus of a convex game: an alternative proof
In 1972, Maschler, Peleg and Shapley proved that in the class of convex the nucleolus and the kernel coincide. The only aim of this note is to provide a shorter, alternative proof of this result.
Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2014-03-25)
In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether sequential choices are visible or not to other participants: agents might be deluded about opponents'capacity to acquire,interpret or keep track of data, or might ...
Games with perceptions
(Deparamento de fundamentos del análisis económico I, 2012-10-23)
We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's ...
The Economics of "Why is it so hard to save a threatened Language?"
(Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, UPV/EHU, 2014-02)
We study the language choice behavior of bilingual speakers in modern societies, such as the Basque Country, Ireland andWales. These countries have two o cial languages:A, spoken by all, and B, spoken by a minority. We ...
International and Intergenerational Dimensions of Climate Change: North-South Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Framework
Global environmental problems such as climate change have both an international and an intertemporal dimension. Recently, some papers have used an overlapping generations framework to analyze the climate change problem ...