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dc.contributor.authorUriarte Ayo, José Ramón ORCID
dc.description.abstractDrift appears to be crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria in a component specifying different out-of-equilibrium behaviour. We propose a new microeconomic model of drift to be added to the learning process by which agents find their way to equilibrium. A key feature of the model is the sensitivity of the noisy agent to the proportion of agents in his player population playing the same strategy as his current one. We show that, 1. Perturbed Payoff-Positive and PayoffMonotone selection dynamics are capable of stabilizing pure non strict Nash equilibria in either singleton or nonsingleton component of equilibria; 2. The model is relevant to understand the role of drift in the behaviour observed in the laboratory for the Ultimatum Game and for predicting outcomes that can be experimentally tested. Hence, the selection dynamics model perturbed with the proposed drift may be seen as well as a new learning tool to understand observed
dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial support, from the Basque Government, grant number PI -1998-68 and from CICYT, grant number
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIkerlanak 2003.01
dc.subjectsimilarity relationses
dc.subjectNash equilibriumes
dc.subjectreplicator dynames
dc.titleA Model of Evolutionay Driftes
dc.rights.holderAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported*
dc.departamentoesFundamentos del análisis económico Ies_ES
dc.departamentoeuEkonomia analisiaren oinarriak Ies_ES

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Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported